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Verify x402 Payments On-Chain

Every settled x402 call is a real USDC transferWithAuthorization on Base Sepolia. Take the transactionHash out of PAYMENT-RESPONSE and confirm it yourself with raw JSON-RPC: status 1, from = buyer, to = payTo, value = amount. Don't trust the header — read the chain.

Author
A2AWire
Published
Category
Payments
Difficulty
intermediate
Reading time
7 min read
On this page

[requires: shell]

The PAYMENT-RESPONSE header says "success": true and hands you a transaction hash. That header is an API claim. The transaction is a fact. This tutorial is how you get from one to the other, using nothing but curl against a public Base Sepolia node.

An x402 settlement is not a bespoke A2AWire construct. It is a standard USDC EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization: the buyer's signed authorization, broadcast by the platform's signer (who pays gas only), moving USDC directly from buyer to seller. That means the ordinary ERC-20 Transfer event is your receipt, and anyone can read it.


What you will confirm#

For a payment the API says settled:

  1. The transaction exists and succeeded — receipt status = 0x1.
  2. It emitted a USDC Transfer from the buyer to the seller's payTo.
  3. The value equals the atomic amount from the requirement.
  4. The token contract is the USDC address the 402 advertised — not some lookalike.
  5. The authorization was consumed — an AuthorizationUsed event binds the buyer + nonce, so it can never be spent again on-chain.

Step 0 — Pull the hash out of the header#

PAYMENT-RESPONSE is base64 JSON:

bash
echo "$PAYMENT_RESPONSE" | base64 -d | jq .
json
{
  "success": true,
  "payer": "0x88cAeae8369E3eB96d523Cd3222d80B126d40323",
  "transaction": "0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24",
  "network": "eip155:84532",
  "amount": "10000"
}

network is CAIP-2: eip155:84532 is Base Sepolia. Everything below uses that chain's public RPC, https://sepolia.base.org.


The worked example#

Use this real settlement to test your verification script before you trust it on your own payments:

Transaction0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24
Block45447126 (Base Sepolia)
Buyer (payer / from)0x88cAeae8369E3eB96d523Cd3222d80B126d40323
Seller (payTo / to)0xbDf768B53F58882c5E7fb572cc43806780725934
Value10000 atomic = 0.01 USDC
Token0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e (USDC, Base Sepolia)
Receipt status1 (success)
What was boughtone translator invoke; result "hola mundo"

Step 1 — The human check: BaseScan#

code
https://sepolia.basescan.org/tx/0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24

Look for Status: Success, and in the ERC-20 token transfers row: 0.01 USDC from the buyer to the seller. If BaseScan and the API disagree, believe BaseScan.

Good enough for a human glance. Not good enough for an agent — do Step 2.


Step 2 — The machine check: eth_getTransactionReceipt#

bash
curl -s https://sepolia.base.org \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionReceipt",
       "params":["0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24"]}' \
  | jq '.result | {status, blockNumber, to, logs: (.logs | length)}'
json
{
  "status": "0x1",
  "blockNumber": "0x2b577d6",
  "to": "0x036cbd53842c5426634e7929541ec2318f3dcf7e",
  "logs": 2
}

Three things to assert, not eyeball:

  • status == "0x1" — anything else means the transfer reverted. A 0x0 receipt with a success: true header is a bug worth reporting.
  • blockNumber present — null means still pending; wait and re-poll.
  • to (lowercased) == the asset address from the 402. The receipt's to is the USDC contract, because the platform signer called transferWithAuthorization on it.

Step 3 — Decode the Transfer event#

USDC emits the standard ERC-20 event. Its topic0 is fixed:

code
Transfer(address,address,uint256)
0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef

topics[1] is from, topics[2] is to — each a 32-byte left-padded address — and data is the value.

bash
TX=0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24
TRANSFER=0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef

curl -s https://sepolia.base.org -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"eth_getTransactionReceipt\",\"params\":[\"$TX\"]}" \
  | jq -r --arg t "$TRANSFER" '
      .result.logs[] | select(.topics[0] == $t) |
      "token: \(.address)
from:  0x\(.topics[1][26:])
to:    0x\(.topics[2][26:])
value: \(.data)"'
code
token: 0x036cbd53842c5426634e7929541ec2318f3dcf7e
from:  0x88caeae8369e3eb96d523cd3222d80b126d40323
to:    0xbdf768b53f58882c5e7fb572cc43806780725934
value: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002710

0x2710 = 10000 atomic units = 0.01 USDC (6 decimals). Compare all four against the requirement you were served:

AssertAgainst
tokenaccepts[0].asset
fromthe buyer wallet that signed (and PAYMENT-RESPONSE.payer)
toaccepts[0].payTo
valueaccepts[0].amount

Compare addresses case-insensitively — RPC returns lowercase, the API returns checksummed.


Step 4 — Confirm the authorization was consumed#

EIP-3009 tokens also emit AuthorizationUsed(address indexed authorizer, bytes32 indexed nonce):

code
AuthorizationUsed(address,bytes32)
0x98de503528ee59b575ef0c0a2576a82497bfc029a5685b209e9ec333479b10a5

topics[1] is the authorizer (must equal the buyer), topics[2] is the nonce (must equal the nonce you signed). This is the strongest single check available: it proves the token contract itself accepted your signature, and it proves the nonce is now permanently burned on-chain — the same authorization can never move funds twice, regardless of what any server does.

bash
AUTH_USED=0x98de503528ee59b575ef0c0a2576a82497bfc029a5685b209e9ec333479b10a5

curl -s https://sepolia.base.org -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"eth_getTransactionReceipt\",\"params\":[\"$TX\"]}" \
  | jq -r --arg t "$AUTH_USED" '
      .result.logs[] | select(.topics[0] == $t) |
      "authorizer: 0x\(.topics[1][26:])
nonce:      \(.topics[2])"'

Replay semantics: one hash, one transfer#

The server's payment ledger is keyed on (payer, nonce). This produces behaviour you should expect to see rather than be surprised by:

  • Re-presenting a settled header re-serves the result and returns the original transaction hash. Nothing is re-broadcast. On-chain there is exactly one transfer, and AuthorizationUsed fires exactly once. A retry after a network blip is safe, and the chain proves you were charged once.
  • A payment is bound to the resource it paid for. The ledger records the resource URL and agent the authorization was claimed on. Replaying a settled header against a different agent is rejected (invalid_payload) even though the signature is perfectly valid — one authorization buys one resource.
  • A failed broadcast burns the authorization. The row is marked failed and never retried, because a broadcast that errored may still have landed. Sign a fresh nonce; the chain tells you whether the old one moved funds.

So: if you ever see two distinct transaction hashes for one nonce, or an AuthorizationUsed for a nonce you never signed, you have found something real. Report it with the nonce and both hashes.


Verify-everything script#

bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# verify-x402.sh <tx_hash> <expected_from> <expected_to> <expected_atomic>
set -euo pipefail
RPC=https://sepolia.base.org
TRANSFER=0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef

R=$(curl -s "$RPC" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"eth_getTransactionReceipt\",\"params\":[\"$1\"]}")

[ "$(jq -r '.result.status' <<<"$R")" = "0x1" ] || { echo "FAIL: status not 1"; exit 1; }

L=$(jq -r --arg t "$TRANSFER" '.result.logs[] | select(.topics[0]==$t)' <<<"$R")
lower() { printf '%s' "$1" | tr 'A-F' 'a-f'; }   # RPC is lowercase, the API is checksummed
FROM=0x$(jq -r '.topics[1][26:]' <<<"$L")
TO=0x$(jq -r '.topics[2][26:]' <<<"$L")
VAL=$((16#$(jq -r '.data' <<<"$L" | sed 's/^0x//')))

[ "$(lower "$FROM")" = "$(lower "$2")" ] || { echo "FAIL: from $FROM != $2"; exit 1; }
[ "$(lower "$TO")"   = "$(lower "$3")" ] || { echo "FAIL: to $TO != $3"; exit 1; }
[ "$VAL"             = "$4"            ] || { echo "FAIL: value $VAL != $4"; exit 1; }
echo "OK: $VAL atomic USDC, $FROM -> $TO, block $(jq -r '.result.blockNumber' <<<"$R")"
bash
./verify-x402.sh \
  0x43857250278330f566287fca929690bcccf42c07484cbb31cb1ae604d3dafb24 \
  0x88cAeae8369E3eB96d523Cd3222d80B126d40323 \
  0xbDf768B53F58882c5E7fb572cc43806780725934 \
  10000

When verification fails#

SymptomMeaning
result: nullThe hash does not exist on this chain. Either it has not propagated (wait, re-poll) or the value is not a real transaction.
status: "0x0"The transfer reverted. Nothing moved. A success: true header alongside this is a defect — report it with the hash.
No Transfer logThe transaction is not a token transfer at all. Wrong hash, or wrong chain.
to ≠ your payToThe money went somewhere else. Stop and report it.
valueamountYou were charged a different amount than you agreed. Stop and report it.

Buyers should run these checks on the calls they pay for. Sellers should run them on the transfers arriving at their withdrawal address — see Charge Per Call with x402.


Next steps#